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Robin Leichenko and Karen O‘Brien have proposed ―double exposure‖ as a conceptual 
framework to demonstrate how processes of globalization and global environmental change 
(GEC) redefine risk and encourage new, interrelated responses to social and ecological 
transitions (O‘Brien and Leichenko, 2000; Leichenko and O'Brien, 2008). In particular, the 
concept encourages researchers and policy makers to consider interplay between global climate 
change and globalization and how this is expressed unevenly across space. After reviewing the 
ways double exposure has been used in the literature, we consider four case studies to investigate 
the utility of the framework for analyzing and understanding climate change adaptation and 
mitigation in the Americas. Our case studies include (1) dengue and malaria outbreaks in 
Jamaica, (2) agriculture in the Argentinean drylands, (3) hydroelectric production in 
northwestern Panama, and (4) climate change mitigation through carbon offsets at a regional 
level in Latin America. We agree with O‘Brien and Leichenko (2000) that double exposure can 
be used to highlight at multiple scales the so-called ‗winners‘ and ‗losers‘ created by current 
global transitions and thus we seek to apply the framework to research in new arenas.  
Double exposure brings focus to human-environmental interactions. This attention could 
be, and often is, recognized without the use of the double exposure framework, but the use of this 
heuristic devise is particularly compelling in that it encourages contemplation about ways in 
which uneven development advantages some groups and individuals at the expense of others. For 
example, those that benefit from globalization and climate change economics can often be 
conceptually paired with those that are made more vulnerable, as we demonstrate in the 
agricultural and energy sectors. In addition, double exposure helps demonstrate the interrelation 
of development trade-offs, as we also exhibit through case study analysis. In our conclusion, to 
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encourage on-going engagement with double exposure as a research lens, we (1) identify 
potential limitations of the existing framework, (2) recommend complementary bodies of 
literature, and (3) discuss ethical implications of our research findings. 
 
 Introduction 
In identifying, measuring, and reporting on vulnerability, we strive to consider multiple, 
interconnected factors that influence how and why humans are affected differently by natural 
hazards and climate change. Institutional, economic, social, and cultural conditions are important 
determinants of adaptive capacity, but each set of variables is highly complex (Trainor, Calef, 
Natcher, Chapin, McGuire, Huntington, Duffy, Rupp, DeWilde, Kwart, Fresco, & Lovecraft, 
2009). The double exposure framework has been presented by O‘Brien and Leichenko (2000, 
2009) as one way to bridge our concern for equity in a connected world while sensitizing our 
analysis to nuanced, interwoven factors. The concept refers to instances where global 
environmental change couples with globalization to influence social, economic, and ecological 
processes in compound, multi-directional, and potentially unexpected ways. While the specific 
benefits and costs to winners and losers in Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) multiply as a result of 
the interactions among variables, there is seldom a blanket response. Ecological processes create 
uneven impacts, but social responses are also varied.  Studies show that some places and some 
people are better able to take advantage of opportunities (Eakin and Lemos, 2006). Others are 
disproportionately vulnerable to climate-related events (Parks and Roberts, 2006; Ribot, 2010) or 
poverty resulting from global economic integration (Olmos, 2001; Thorbecke and Nissanke, 
2006). In many instances, social processes serve to amplify negative repercussions for 
marginalized populations rather than to reduce them.  
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 It is timely to engage in research pertaining to globalization and climate change given on-
going policy discussions. Nearly all scientists accept evidence demonstrating human-induced 
climate change (IPCC, 2007). Strong general agreement among climate scientists continues to be 
affirmed in independent studies designed to evaluate scientific consensus (see, for example, 
Gillis, 2010).  Nonetheless, the disappointing international climate negotiations in Copenhagen 
in 2009 and the continued failure of policy makers in the United States to enact national climate 
policy demonstrates challenges to enacting public policies to respond to shared challenges 
(Krosnick, 2010; Rahm, 2010). In climate programs and policy, whether locally, nationally, or 
internationally designed and implemented, issues of social justice and determining shared 
responsibility must remain forefront. For this reason, we argue double exposure analysis 
provides an important tool to inform policy debates. We demonstrate this utility through the 
analysis of social and environmental justice within four Latin America case studies.  
We argue, similar to O‘Brien and Leichenko (2007/2008), that equity and connectivity 
are central elements to applications of double exposure. With these factors in mind, to what 
extent can double exposure be used to identify, explain, and report on climate change mitigation 
and adaptation in the Americas? We seek to answer this question by first reviewing the existing 
literature on double exposure and then testing the applicability of this research lens through 
analysis of four case studies. Our conclusion presents findings on the utility and limitations of 
double exposure for understanding dynamic, multi-scale, human-environment interactions. 
 
Double Exposure: A Literature Review 
 It is increasingly accepted that ―single-stressor-single outcome‖ approaches to studying 
vulnerability fail to capture the reality of most systems (Eakin and Luers, 2006). Indeed, the 
influence of global economic, cultural, political, and environmental processes on the production 
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and management of risks in local contexts is widely accepted (Eakin, 2005). Climate change is 
widely recognized as a ―risk multiplier,‖ increasing the impact of a variety of risks not directly 
related to global environmental change (Christoplos, 2010). Likewise, Eakin (2005) argues 
―delineating the linkages between economic globalization, market liberalization, and 
environmental change at different scales is an essential task in vulnerability analysis‖ (p. 1923). 
Yet empirical analysis of this multiplication process is lacking. Some quantitative studies have 
attempted to identify and map the overlap of social and environmental vulnerability indicators 
(see Cutter (2010) for specific examples), but many cases have yet to be verified through 
qualitative methods. The challenge to understanding vulnerability is to identify how economic 
and environmental processes interact in particular places and times, and then how these 
interactions, in turn, shape the impacts of global change processes while simultaneously driving 
others (Silva, Eriksen, & Ombe, 2010). 
 In 2000, O‘Brien and Leichenko introduced double exposure as a framework for 
considering the impacts of climate change and globalization. Starting with the assumption that 
climate change and globalization will impact regions, sectors, social groups and ecosystems 
differently, double exposure provides a means to identify the winners and losers from these 
processes.  For example, consider the case of Brazil. Economic globalization and currency 
devaluation impacted the livelihoods of residents who lived in favelas (shantytowns). 
Simultaneously, these urban poor are also among the groups most vulnerable to climatic change 
since hillsides are prone to mudslides and flooding, which may increase in both frequency and 
magnitude with global environmental change (O‘Brien and Leichenko, 2000). Increasing 
temperatures and heavy rains also may increase the risk of malaria and cholera outbreaks. This 
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example demonstrates how double exposure captures the connections of economic globalization 
and climate change for a social group in a specific locale. 
 O‘Brien and Leichenko (2007/2008) argue that double exposure has two important 
dimensions that animate the framework: equity and connectivity. The equity dimension 
highlights that not all individuals, communities, regions, and nations will be equally affected by 
climate change. In turn, the connectivity dimension emphasizes that the security of individuals 
and communities is increasingly linked to those of others across space and time. Acknowledging 
that outcomes for one group of people are often related to outcomes for other groups orients our 
focus. Together, equity and connectivity make double exposure a people-based approach to 
understanding climate change. 
 Double exposure is more than a simple acknowledgement that vulnerability to climate 
change is influenced by multiple processes of global change. Double exposure argues that 
changing economic and social policies influence the capacity to cope with and adapt to climate 
change (O‘Brien and Leichenko, 2007/2008). For example, a farmer may have an appropriate 
adaptation to climate change (e.g., crop rotation or diversification) that ends up being poorly 
compensated due to the demands of global markets. Although some places, sectors, and social 
groups experience higher levels of exposure, it is important to note that vulnerability is not 
limited to developing countries. For example, elderly populations in the United States may be at 
risk for death during heat waves, particularly those living on fixed incomes.  
 
Applications and Uses 
Double exposure has been used in a variety of different ways. O‘Brien et al. (2009) 
invoke it as a theory that explains how the two global processes result in increases in inequalities 
and vulnerabilities and reduce resilience. More often, however, double exposure is not treated as 
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a theory. Instead, it is used as a framework or concept to label multiple exposures. For example, 
Egende-Nissen and Venema (2009) point to double feedback loops in the Arctic using the term 
double exposure. 
In the Arctic context, the double exposures are in double feedback: loss of Arctic ice 
from global warming leads to decreased albedo; and more warming and more ice loss in 
the Arctic, which, as noted earlier, plays a critical role in global climate regulation. Arctic 
policy feedback then amplifies the biophysical feedback: loss of ice allows more fossil 
fuel exploitation and more global warming (Egende-Nissen and Venema, 2009, p. 6). 
 
Silva, Eriksen, & Ombe (2010) use the concept in a similar manner but are careful to point out 
that double exposures are different from multiple exposures as a general term.  
Double exposure is more than just the fact of multiple processes happening in the same 
place at the same time. It is rather that the processes interact and, in doing so, influence 
the exposure and capacity of people and places to respond to a wide array of stressors and 
shocks in a way that creates new contexts for experiencing and responding to change. 
Pathways to increased vulnerability (or enhanced resilience) are multidirectional, so that 
socioeconomic conditions may mediate the impacts of environmental change, but 
changing environmental conditions may also alter socioeconomic capacities to maintain 
particular livelihood strategies (p. 9). 
 
Following the use of double exposure as a concept, sometimes it is simply used as a noun to 
describe the ―double exposure‖ due to globalization and climate change (e.g., Eakin, 2005; 
Malone, 2002). 
 Christoplos (2010) argues that double exposure is best treated as a heuristic device that can 
be used to highlight the overlaps between globalization and climate change.  
Awareness of double exposures has been important as a heuristic device for drawing 
attention to the social, political and economic forces related to both the causes and the 
effects of climate change. It has highlighted that both global environmental change and 
globalisation are highly ―transformative‖ in that profound changes are underway. There 
will be new ―winners and losers‖ as some vulnerabilities will be reduced and others 
exacerbated due to the interplay between these two sets of factors (Leichenko and 
O‘Brien, 2008, p. 8). 
 
 Much of the research using double exposure has focused on agriculture (e.g. Eakin, 2005; 
McGuigan, Reynolds & Wiedmer, 2002; Silva, Eriksen, & Ombe, 2010). It has also been used in 
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research evaluating geoengineering efforts in the Arctic (Egende-Nissen and Venema, 2009) and 
water scarity (O‘Brien and Leichenko, 2008). O‘Brien and Leichenko (2007/2008) apply double 
exposure to examples in various contexts, but similar breadth of application has not yet been 
demonstrated broadly in scholarly research.  
 
Four Case Study Examples from Latin America and the Caribbean 
The literature review suggests broad applicability of double exposure, although it has 
generally been applied to cases of agriculture and climate change adaptation. We offer four cases 
studies that help test the scope and utility of double exposure. Our cases were chosen to include 
diverse factors, including new sectors (health care and energy) and a range of scales (regional, 
national, and transnational). Moreover, we wanted to explore whether double exposures could be 
used to examine climate change mitigation efforts in addition to adaptation and vulnerability.  
Following Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008), we employ the approach of using double 
exposure to identify winners and losers. We must express an overall concern is with the 
terminology ‗winners‘ and ‗losers.‘ While it gets a key point across effectively, the identification 
of disadvantaged or marginalized population as ‗losers‘ is potentially offensive. There is usually 
a negative slant associated with being a called a loser that we are certain Robin Leichenko and 
Karen O‘Brien did not intend, and we do not wish to imply this stigma with our application of 
their terminology. 
Our first case study focuses on the potential of dengue fever outbreaks in Jamaica, 
applying double exposure to the health sector on a national level to highlight ‗double losers‘ that 
are more susceptible to disease due to the combined impacts of globalization and climate change. 
The second case study focuses on agricultural production in the Mendoza region of Argentina, 
pointing to the ways in which certain farmers have more options for climate change adaptation 
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while farmers that have already been hurt by wealth concentration due to globalization are more 
vulnerable to climate change. The third case focuses on the energy sector in the region of Bocas 
del Toro, Panama where a proposed dam project designed to mitigate the impacts of climate 
change contributes to the violation of Indigenous Peoples‘ rights. Finally, the fourth case 
considers the ‗double winners‘ from mitigation windfalls from transnational carbon trading. At 
the same time, the analysis also points to inequities within the current and proposed trading 
systems that perpetuate existing disparities between social groups, nations, and regions. 
 
Case Study One: Double Exposures in the Jamaican Health Sector 
As indicated previously, O‘Brien and Leichenko (2000) advanced the concept of ‗double 
exposure‘ in which the two global processes of climate change and globalization will result in a 
set of ‗winners‘ and ‗losers.‘ They have expressed the view that although the concept may be 
especially important in situations where the negative consequences of climate change and global 
environmental change are highly likely to be experienced, the ‗winners‘ and ‗losers‘ resulting 
from the interaction of the two processes may be different from the set of ‗winners‘ and ‗losers,‘ 
which are identified when each of the two processes is examined independently. Development is 
clearly an uneven process, but some trends are evident. For example, in some instances, regional 
disparities in levels of economic development are accentuated by the process of globalization, 
including neoliberal reforms such as structural adjustment programs, as well as by climate 
change. These interactions are clearly occurring in Jamaica. 
   Although it is widely accepted that globalization and global environmental change will 
have significant impacts on human health and on the health sector in general, the concept of 
double exposure has never really been used to a large extent to highlight some of these 
implications for the health sector.  The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the applicability 
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of double exposure for exploring vulnerability with specific reference to the Jamaican health 
sector and the threat of increased dengue fever incidence. 
 
Background 
Retrospective analysis of the climatic data by the Climate Studies Group, Mona (CSGM) 
at the University of the West Indies showed that the Caribbean region experienced a warming 
trend during the past two decades (Peterson, Taylor, Demeritte, Duncombe, Burton, Thompson, 
Porter, Mercedes, Villegas, Semexant Fils, Klien Tank, Martis, Warner, Joyette, Mills, 
Alexander, and Gleason, 2002). A similar upward trend was noted for a number of rainfall 
indices also calculated for the Caribbean over the past four decades. Results from CSGM have 
also established an association between climate change and the occurrence of dengue fever 
outbreaks in the Caribbean. Peaks in occurrences are associated with warmer conditions, and the 
seasonality of the epidemics suggests that temperature and precipitation have some explanatory 
value. A prospective study is under way, but preliminary results indicate a continuation of the 
warming trend. Caribbean islands, therefore, should brace themselves for increasing outbreaks of 
a disease, which is debilitating, and which, in its dengue hemorrhagic manifestations, can cause 
loss of life.  
 
Results: Jamaican Health Care Study 
One in-depth study conducted recently in Jamaica has shown that a substantial number of 
people living in conditions that are conducive to the proliferation of the vector and virus are 
vulnerable (Heslop-Thomas, Bailey, Amarakoon, Chen, Rawlins, Chadee, Crosbourne, Owino, 
Polson, Rhoden, Stennett and Taylor, 2008). It has demonstrated the vulnerability of those living 
in informal settlements. State data reveal that 25 percent of the population, approximately 
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675,000 people, lives in squatter settlements (Ministry of Environment and Housing, 2009a, 
2009b). It is clear that Jamaica faces a problem of great magnitude. Beset with competing urgent 
claims (e.g., HIV/AIDS transmission, rising sea level, extreme poverty, organized crime, etc.), 
the country does not see preparation for the possibility of a large outbreak of dengue as a 
priority. If an epidemic occurs, state agencies do not have the capacity to contain exposure.  
Not unexpectedly, the poor are the most vulnerable. In 2009, 10 percent of the population 
of the island lived below the poverty line, and this is expected to increase.  In addition, poverty is 
more prevalent in rural areas (PIOJ/STATIN, 2009); these communities, which account for 
roughly 48 percent of the population, are more vulnerable. Contrary to popular belief, the poor 
are not necessarily unemployed. In fact, many of the poor work as domestic workers and earn the 
minimum wage.  
There is merit to the view of the Ministry of Health that communities must take some 
responsibility for vector control. But this has to be a policy position rather than a defensive 
posture. As policy, calls for community responsibility must be supported by initiatives aimed at 
empowering communities to assume control. Public education is necessary to address the 
knowledge gap revealed in the study (Heslop-Thomas et al, 2008). More than a half of those 
interviewed in communities could not say what causes the disease, and the overwhelming 
majority had no knowledge of its symptoms. Vulnerable groups, therefore, do not have the tools 
to protect themselves from dengue outbreaks.  
Despite calls for community responsibility, responsibility is shared. The government’s 
responsibility is clearly outlined by WHO (1997). One area needing government intervention is 
with the risk associated with improper water storage. Many rural areas do not have access to 
pipe-borne water while squatter communities in urban areas are not, by law, to have a pipe-borne 
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supply. The problem of water has to be tackled on two fronts—the provision of low-cost, secure 
drums, and the granting of security of tenure to those who, because of their status, are denied 
access to running water. 
There are public sector organizations that have been given the mandate to mitigate 
hazards in the island and to promote sustainable development. These organizations seem focused 
almost completely on threats posed by sea level rise. No one can deny the threat posed by this 
phenomenon to small islands that have their most valuable assets and most of their people on low 
coastal plains. This is a more attractive, more seductive area of focus than a health threat, 
especially when the disease is known. Nonetheless, not all of the public sector agencies should 
become so absorbed with the gradual encroaching of the sea to the exclusion of more imminent 
threats. They should be persuaded to broaden their concept of a hazard; to realize that the threat 
of an increase in the occurrence of a debilitating and possibly deadly disease is not incompatible 
with their mandate; to see threats to health as threats to sustainable development and include 
these issues in their public education programs. The Jamaican Ministry of Health, by itself, is in 
no position to meet the challenge of increased disease transmission in the island. There is need 
for a concerted effort of collaboration with various public and private sector environmental 
organizations. These are elements in the country‘s generic capacity which constitute the 
foundation for adaptation. 
 
Conclusion: Double Exposure in Jamaican Health Care 
The concept of ‗double exposure‘ can be used to highlight the double whammy in so far 
as vulnerability to dengue fever in Jamaica is concerned.  Here is a country that has been hit by 
globalization and deteriorating macro and micro economic conditions.  As it is trying to grapple 
with these issues, its coping strategies will now need to include dealing with an imminent threat 
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of dengue epidemics.  A large non-immune population with less than adequate knowledge about 
the disease and its transmission, and a Ministry of Health which cannot address these issues due 
to resource constraints are good examples of two forces working to the detriment of a people-
who may now be categorized rightly by this concept as ‗double losers.‘  
 
Case Study Two: Double Exposure in Agricultural Production in the Argentinean 
Drylands 
In central western Argentina, the Mendoza River follows a quite spread out pattern in the 
Central Andes: it originates in the snow-crested mountain range and flows toward the lower 
plains, providing water for the irrigation oases developed on the foothills. This scheme develops 
in two opposed landscapes: on the one hand, a green oasis is lined with neat rows of grapevines, 
tree-bordered roads and streets, and irrigation channels and drains. This is the powerful oasis 
where human work celebrates having conquered a hostile nature. On the other hand, non-
irrigated lands are a "no-man's land" and subordinate spaces perceived as being empty and void 
of interest. Whereas the oasis concentrates the dynamism of the one million inhabitants of 
Mendoza city and an export viticulture-based economy, the scattered population of non-irrigated 
lands barely survives on out-of-market economic activities, devastated by poverty and 
desertification processes (Montaña, Torres, Abraham, Torres, & Pastor, 2005). 
Under this light, the communities developed in the eastern foothills of the central Andes 
could be considered as modern hydraulic societies in which the social tissue is strongly 
associated with a comprehensive and intensive water resource manipulation within an order 
imposed for controlling a hostile environment (Worster, 1985). As power distributions are 
associated to water management, water would have the capacity to express -and also model- 
hegemonic and subordinate social relations of a hierarchical system. 
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As links between water and community are very high in these areas, global 
environmental change (GEC) and water scarcity deepening scenarios could cause not only spatial 
changes but also affect social processes while also influencing the existing nature-society 
relationships. As in other dry lands of South America, in the Mendoza river basin water is a 
restricting factor for human settlement and agriculture. The intensive viticulture and horticulture 
are only possible if tied to water management, making use of surface water distributed by the 
irrigation network or pumping groundwater. But climate also imposes its conditions, as freezing 
and hail annually cause crop losses and warming vineyards need cold temperatures for reaching 
proper maturity. 
Global environmental change scenarios (2020-2030) for the Mendoza River basin are 
similar to other rivers originating in the central Andes (Boninsegna and Villalba, 2007). They 
forecast a rise of 1.5°C in the mean temperature, a diminishing of precipitations over 100 
millimeters, and a 150 meter rising of the 0°C isotherm, reducing the snow accumulation. As a 
result of these changes, the volume of flow of the Mendoza River is expected to diminish 
between 7 and 13%. The hydrograph of this nival regime river would also be affected. The peak 
discharge would be advanced one month, increasing spring flows (October and November) and 
lowering the summer outflows (January to March). This poses threats to agricultural and 
livestock activities already restricted by water scarcity, affecting farmers but also the entire 
agricultural-based regional economy. 
 
Farmers facing global environmental change 
Research has focused on the situations to be faced by farmers in three representative 
productive systems of the basin. Two of them are agricultural activities developed within the 
oasis irrigation system: one permanent (viticulture) and the other annual (horticulture, mostly 
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olericulture). The third, goat husbandry, is an extensive livestock activity taking place mainly for 
subsistence purposes in non-irrigated areas upstream and especially at the tail of the basin.  
For these productive systems, vulnerability to global environmental change appears to be 
related to different factors: 
A. Nature of the productive system: Oasis agriculture vs. non-irrigated extensive goat husbandry     
A first analysis must differentiate between the agricultural systems (viticulture and 
horticulture) relying on irrigation from extensive goat husbandry developed in non-irrigated 
zones. Diminishing precipitation will not affect the first but will decrease the natural vegetation 
of the desert, affecting goat husbandry and deepening the desertification processes already in 
place. Drought periods hit very hard on this activity, testing its survival limits and compromising 
alimentary security of its domestic production units. The extreme poverty of this population 
could raise a paradoxical situation around vulnerability. The benefits of goat husbandry are so 
scarce that the incomes of these domestic production units must be complemented with others 
coming from temporary agricultural or urban activities and State subsidies. Thus, these producers 
would be more diversified than those devoted exclusively to agriculture and would be more 
likely to adopt a wider range of adaptive strategies. Leaving theoretical arguments aside, their 
extreme poverty is closely related to their vulnerability and reduces resilience, not only for 
facing climate change but in general terms. 
The diminishing river runoff will be harder on agricultural farmers who rely on the 
surface irrigation network. In the context of a system that allocates water proportionally to the 
plot surface (independently from the land being used or the type of crop), viticulture farmers will 
be favored over horticulture producers because of the vineyards lower water consumption and 
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more resistance to water stress. On the other hand, the annual cycle of horticulture makes 
adaptive strategies such as moving to better locations in terms of climate and water risks easier. 
Agricultural farmers will see adaptation to hydrogram alterations facilitated by the 
operation of the dams regulating the rivers. But ecological flows are not being considered in the 
dams operation, so the river regulation for favoring water consumptions in the oasis prevents 
water surplus from reaching the tail of the basin where the desert communities are receiving less 
and less water as the rural and urban oasis upstream continues its development. This subordinate 
position in the hydraulic society explains a good deal of the vulnerabilities of desert 
communities. 
The nature of the productive system has appeared a crucial factor of the vulnerability, but 
the analysis gives evidence that this ―nature‖ has strong social components not related to climate, 
and exposures are also leading to poverty and social power issues.  
(B) Structure of the productive chain and the farmer’s position in it 
Mendoza‘s river basin horticulture is an agricultural mosaic formed by a great number of 
heterogeneous producers. The distribution channels are also varied in the context of a loosely 
regulated sector in which the informal economy is significant. The complicated and unstable 
decision-making processes horticultural farmers face does not encourage investments for 
reducing exposures. This structure also creates hurdles for implementation of institutional 
measures that could help the most disadvantaged producers face GEC scenarios. 
In contrast, viticulture shows a clear structure with horizontal and vertical integrations 
and regulations set by formal institutional arrangements. Adaptive measures could be fostered 
here not only from the state but also by existing farmers‘ organizations. But, as integrated and 
organized as this structure is, the farmers‘ universe is quite polarized between the producers that 
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make wine and are directly involved in the wine export circuit and those small and medium 
farmers whose participation in the chain remains subordinate. Are state institutions potentially 
co-opted by the more powerful agents? This takes us to our next key factor. 
(C) Farmer typology 
Farmers‘ typology (―big/small,‖ ―capital intensive/traditional,‖ ―export/domestic,‖ or any 
other construct showing power differences) is directly related to vulnerability, in goat husbandry 
as well as in the oasis agricultural systems. Economic wealth of big farmers allows them to 
overcome reduced surface water allocations by pumping groundwater. In the context of loosely 
regulated groundwater management, they can even become independent from the ―democratic‖ 
but tedious water users organization mechanisms and just turn on the pump whenever it fits their 
irrigation needs, obtaining water volumes only restricted by affordable (and subsidized) energy 
prices. In the same way, they have a better position to adopt other vulnerability reducing 
measures such as pressurized irrigation to make a more efficient water use or hail net protection. 
Unlike the more disadvantaged farmers, they can move to better locations, an adaptive strategy 
that is currently being seen not only in horticulture farmers that rent the land for their annual 
crops but also in big winemakers buying land and building wineries in upstream foothill 
locations.         
(D) Location in the basin 
Finally, position in the basin appeared to be a vulnerability factor more related to natural 
explanations but also related with the social, economical and governance factors mentioned 
above. The more successful agricultural farmers (especially those integrated to the export sector) 
gradually climb the foothills to settle in the upper oasis lands, looking for lower temperatures, 
better standard of water rights (less likely to be cut back in a drought situation), better water 
19 
 
quality, and less pollution, in some cases pushing the agricultural border upstream by means of 
groundwater pumping. These are capital-intensive properties relatively protected against climate 
and water risks. On the other hand, those farmers whose benefits are not enough for affording 
those prime locations must resign themselves to the less attractive traditional oasis locations with 
fewer resources to reduce their exposure and to work out adaptive strategies. These farmers will 
be in greater need of institutional support to cope with the expected effects of GEC.  
 
Double exposures, multiple exposures 
In these basins, farmers‘ vulnerability depends upon the nature of their activity, as some 
of them are more water and climate sensitive to GEC scenarios than others. Beyond that, there 
are some other factors also affecting farmers‘ vulnerability (exposure and adaptive capacities) 
within the same productive system. Some of these factors seem to be related to power 
relationships and to equity issues of these hydraulic societies. Being wealthy and successful in 
the wine and food markets, having access to technology (irrigation and others), being vertically 
and horizontally integrated, and being favored by the use of the better and more expensive 
upstream lands turns out to be shielding factors and indicators of a broader availability of 
adaptive resources.  
Factors and mechanisms that could make farmers more or less vulnerable in GEC 
scenarios have shown a significant similarity to those who explain their performance while 
facing the new challenges of the globalized agrifood markets during the 1990s. At that time, the 
weakest producers, those who couldn‘t keep pace with the new rules of the game, were 
negatively affected, even pushed out of business, while a concentration process took place in 
favor of the more powerful agents. It seems that GEC effects will affect farmers in central-
western Argentina in an analogous way, this time adding its effects to the ones already produced 
20 
 
by globalization. Here is where double exposures are found, equity issues are raised and the 
process could be explained with reference to ‗winners‘ and ‗losers.‘   
 
Case Study Three: Double Exposure in the Energy Sector in Bocas del Toro, Panama  
The Bocas del Toro Province in northwestern Panama provides an illustrative example of 
double exposure in the energy sector at a sub-national scale. News reports demonstrate 
widespread public discontent in the province over the lack of basic services and human rights 
violations. State-sponsored mistreatment and intimidation of Bocas del Toro indigenous groups 
is evident in media coverage (Arcía, 2009a, 2009b; La Prensa, 2010). Press reports and 
testimonies from local indigenous inhabitants suggest violence was used to quell local opposition 
to foreign-sponsored large-scale dams being constructed on Naso and Ngӧbe lands (Brannan 
Jaén, 2008; Jordán, I. M., 2008; Jordán, O., 2008; IAHCR, 2009, pers. comm., June 7, 2009). 
AES-Changuinola, a subsidiary of the US-based energy giant AES Corp, is rapidly 
developing Chan 75, a $560 million and 222 megawatt dam in Bocas del Toro. Chan 75 
construction requires relocation of Ngӧbe villages and has created the context for authoritative 
control of impacted populations (i.e., with fences, police checkpoints, travel restrictions, etc.) 
(Jordán, O., 2008; Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010). After visiting the area, the United Nations 
(UN) Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous Peoples determined that free and informed consent did not occur before the hydro 
concession was allocated (Anaya, 2009). Local populations have since attempted to halt the 
dam‘s construction with petitions, testimony, and court cases in front of the Organization of 
American State (OAS) human rights agencies. 
Chan 75 hydroelectric project shifted resource management power away from local 
populations and toward the private sector (Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010). AES-
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Changuinola‘s contract with the Panama‘s National Environmental Authority (ANAM) 
transitioned responsibility for 6,000 hectares of public lands in the Palo Seco Forest Reserve to 
the private firm. The state decided local village populations would be permitted to remain near 
their original settlements within the forest reserve, but they would not receive title to their lands 
even though villages pre-date the creation of the protected area. Palo Seco was created in 1983 
with the specific objective of safeguarding water resources for hydroelectric production 
(Paiemont, 2007).  
AES-Changuinola and ANAM officials frequently reiterate the importance of forest 
cover to maintain efficient functioning of Chan 75 dam. State and company officials are planning 
agroforestry and tourism initiatives to redirect local production toward economic activities 
identified as conducive with hydroelectric energy generation and carbon sales from forested 
areas surrounding the dam (Blanco, 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010). Watershed 
management for electricity production and emission offsets is being valued above subsistence 
agriculture and fishing in local communities and as a result profound restructuring of indigenous 
communities is occurring. According to village leaders, neighboring Naso indigenous 
communities face a similar situation (pers. comm., June 7, 2009). Construction of the Bonyic 
dam with multinational investment moves forward in spite of Naso petitions in front of 
international human rights tribunals aiming to stop the project. Since initiation, Chan 75 and 
Bonyic dams have been promoted as clean energy projects providing greenhouse gas emission 
reductions.  
Dam construction creates double exposure for local populations because climate change 
has intensified the need to protect the watershed. Simultaneously global climate change has 
reinforced the need for a global transition to clean energy sources, and, in particular, to find 
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replacements for fossil fuels. While the transition to renewable energy is imperative, it does not 
justify authoritarianism. Since sustainable development requires participatory and inclusive 
processes (Chandani, 2007; Burkett, 2008; Comin, 2008), analysis of dam building in 
northwestern Panama suggest the importance of paying attention to not only the end product of 
climate change mitigation and electricity production, but also the means to arrive at that goal.  
The double exposure framework is clearly broad and inclusive enough to include studies 
of the energy sector. The benefit of applying double exposure is that it demonstrates that those 
who profit and those who are harmed are impacted differently by the exact same electricity 
source. This connection is often ignored. While private developers suggest the dams will reduce 
vulnerability for Panamanian society by producing reliable and affordable energy, most energy 
will fed to the national grid and be sent to urban and industrial zones. Ironically, rural 
populations paying the highest social and ecological costs near large-scale dam sites often do not 
have access to basic services such as electricity (McCully, 2001).   
Negative impacts identified in double exposure research (such as in O‘Brien and 
Leichenko, 2000; O‘Brien et al., 2004; Leichenko and O‘Brien 2008) can frequently be 
identified as development trade-offs. In the case of Bocas del Toro, given pressing concerns 
about human rights violations, should potential vulnerabilities be ranked or somehow weighed 
against one another? Does double exposure help us understand how to value factors as diverse as 
renewable energy promotion, clean water, biodiversity, human rights, land rights, or self-
determination when trade-offs are being proposed between them? For example, Chan 75 dam has 
been also criticized by international scientists because of probable negative impacts for 
biodiversity within internationally recognized protected areas located nearby, including La 
Amistad World Heritage Site (McLarney and Mafla, 2007). Due to the breadth of the framework, 
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double exposure may not be sufficiently attentive to each factor involved and it does not inform 
us about the relative importance of each element. To be fair, this remains a limitation in much 
social science research. Double exposure‘s central benefit to climate change policy analysis is 
that it reminds researchers to connect interrelated human-environment transitions in ways that 
are often overlooked, but individual researchers still need to decide how to interpret the 
importance of each factor. 
The energy sector in Bocas del Toro exhibits a development dilemma with ethical 
underpinnings. Who defines community resilience, and whose definition matters? In the case of 
Chan 75, the project administrator suggests the local communities will benefit from relocated and 
restructured villages (pers. comm., June 8, 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010). Can 
resilience be augmented by outsiders? Does it matter if customary practices are lost? A 
complaint of Bocas del Toro Indigenous Peoples is that there has been extensive tinkering with 
self-governance and local institutions on the part of the Panamanian state and private developers 
(Jordan, O., 2008; Anaya 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). Communities have been torn 
apart not only by resettlement but also by intimidation of dam opponents. Moreover, impacted 
Ngӧbe testified in front of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that the state 
influenced the selection of local leaders, and thus subsequent negotiations in 2009 affirming the 
project were essentially staged events lacking broad participation (IAHCR, 2009). A Ngӧbe 
leader acknowledged that state agencies often work to erode the authority of communal leaders 
in the province and actively promote and knowingly recognize self-appointed individuals 
without the support of their people, as a means to usurp power from legitimate leaders (pers. 
comm., May 2, 2010). Outside intervention in local institutions has been profoundly disruptive to 
community cohesion in Naso and Ngӧbe territories (Paiemont, 2007; Jordan, O., 2008; Anaya 
24 
 
2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010) and is in violation of self-determination as outlined in 
the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, an international norm that 
Panama supported. State agencies and private sector actors seek to assure their ability to control 
natural resource extraction and use, but their actions may promulgate new forms of vulnerability. 
Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) address cultural loss as one factor within double exposure, but 
implications for diverse ethnic and racial groups may be overshadowed by the large number of 
other variables simultaneously under consideration. 
 
Case Study Four: Mitigation Windfalls in Latin America 
This section examines recently established and emerging greenhouse gas (GHG) 
mitigation schemes to assess interrelated feedback from globalization and climate change leading 
to windfall profits. Groups benefiting from GHG mitigation would likely be identified as ‗double 
winners,‘ in the sense of Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008), since many gained their advantageous 
economic position from investments in the global economy prior to becoming involved in carbon 
markets. There has been little scholarly research on those who have profited from adaptation or 
mitigation programs, but see Lohmann (2005, 2008), Bumpus and Liverman (2008), Haigh 
(2008), and Hazlewood (2010) for a few examples. Given data limitations, we discuss social and 
environmental justice issues emerging in the climate change mitigation literature, with a focus on 
Latin America. Although global trends are evident in adaptation and mitigation, it is always 
necessary to be aware of regional and local differences (Leichenko and O‘Brien, 2008; Eakin 






The Rise of Emission Trading 
Emission trading has grown exponentially since the mid-2000s under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), the European Union‘s Emission Trading System (EU-ETS), 
and other frameworks (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Brohé, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009; Giddens, 
2009; Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010; World Bank, 2010). Figures 
from the World Bank show more than tenfold growth in the carbon market exchanges in the past 
five years and record the value traded in 2009 as $144 billion dollars. A Global Business 
Intelligence report highlights how the global carbon market grew at compound annual growth 
rate of 89% to reach its 2009 level. There is considerable additional growth predicted: carbon 
credits linked to a reduction of even ten percent of global deforestation should be worth billions 
of dollars (Ebeling and Yasué, 2008). It is important to note that the price of carbon is still 
relatively low, usually under $15 dollars per ton. World Bank economists believe $50 dollar per 
ton is a more realistic estimate of true value (pers. comm., July 16, 2010). 
There is a long list of economic sectors that benefit from carbon markets and a very short 
list of academic papers on the topic. In many instances carbon trade has emerged from a 
specialized branch of existing operations, but there has also been the creation of whole new 
entities (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). The social and environmental impact standards and 
assessment tools used by each company vary greatly.  Research on carbon brokers is difficult to 
conduct: brokers do not share prices and often prohibit their business partners from discussing 
specific contract details, according to project managers interviewed in Nicaragua (pers. comm., 
January 5-6, 2009). There are clearly profits to be made: by 2005 the World Bank anticipated its 




Firms increasingly mainstream strategies to mitigate climate change into daily operations. 
As this process increases, many businesses actively lobby individually and/or by sector to 
influence climate policy in ways that assist their bottom line (Haigh, 2008). This type of self-
interested or profit-motivated thinking extends beyond the private sector. Giddens (2009) 
identifies a tendency for everyone from politicians to the general public to select particular 
angles from broader climate change debates to advance their prior political or economic agenda, 
instead of viewing the potentially repercussions of global environmental change holistically or 
objectively. 
Everyone wants a percentage of the profit from carbon markets, including environmental 
organizations. Representatives of the major international environmental groups noted that carbon 
markets provide an economic opportunity, stating: 
For a number of years conservation organizations have been lamenting the decline in 
available funding. Carbon funds, however, are growing at a phenomenal rate, and offer 
the potential to make up some of the shortfall (Roe, Reid, Vaughan, Brickell, & Elliott, 
2007, p. 1). 
 
Clearly not all funds from carbon sales will go directly to offsetting GHG emissions. Regulators 
and participants in these markets need to decide what percentage they are comfortable assigning 
to brokers, consultants, verifiers, and promoters. These earnings remain largely in middle and 
high income countries where trading and consulting operations are consolidated. Meanwhile, the 
high transaction costs for CDM verification, some of which is paid to intermediaries offering 
specialized services, are discouraging small-scale and community-based projects in developing 
countries with limited financial capital from pursuing verification in spite of the potential of 





A Mitigation Research Framework 
Mitigation projects targeting low-cost reductions may multiply existing and new human-
environment risks, with the highest costs often felt among vulnerable social groups. Applying a 
double exposure framework to climate change mitigation fits squarely with the research 
trajectory Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) propose, but it is an extension of most scholarly work 
concerning climate change exposures as studies have tended to focus on adaptation (for example, 
O‘Brien et al., 2004; Thomas and Twyman, 2005; Leichenko and O‘Brien 2002, 2008). 
Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) suggest that double exposure would fit in the case of biofuels. We 
suggest broader application is possible, although we identify a potential analytical weakness. 
While we support attention to interrelations between global climate change and economic 
change, we also suggest mitigation researchers should seek early on to identify the influence of 
politics and the roles of multi-scale political actors given the disputed nature of climate 
governance in multiple arenas (Harriss-White, 2008; Giddens, 2009; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010; 
Ribot, 2010). 
Although O‘Brien and Leichenko (2000) and Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) suggest that 
there can be ‗winners‘ as well as ‗losers‘ from double exposures, they never identify or expand 
upon the specific attributes of so-called ‗double winners.‘ Nonetheless, double exposure presents 
itself as a productive and helpful lens to use to examine climate change mitigation because it 
shows connections between social sectors that benefit and other sectors that are harmed. Worth 
(2009, p.5-6) breaks key problems in climate change mitigation down into what she calls the 
‗triple injustices:‘ (1) climate change is hitting the poor first and worst; (2) those most affected 
did not cause it and are powerless to stop it; and (3) the polluters are not paying. If the double 
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exposure framework helps demonstrate how injustices such as these are interconnected, it makes 
important theoretical and practical contributions. 
 
Mitigation and Multiple Exposures 
We do not suggest that all GHG emission exchanges are problematic or unjust; however, 
exploitative and/or fraudulent trade has serious repercussions, including: (1) limitations to 
sustainable development, (2) threats to social and distributive justice, and (3) constraints to 
actual reductions in GHG emissions. It has been shown that perverse incentives in poorly 
designed policies can increase emissions or counterbalance effective reductions (Lohmann, 2005, 
2006; Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009).  Plants created to produce the potent GHG called HFC-23 
are the most popular example. Although not found in Latin America, HFC-23 cases bloated the 
entire CDM system. Defining a fair method to value HFC-23 emission credits remains a point of 
contention. Perverse incentives in carbon markets waste resources: time and energy utilized to 
restrict HFC-23 production could have been spent reducing emissions from other sources.  
There are various accuracy concerns in voluntary GHG markets: for example, news 
reports discuss cases of institutions reselling or double counting credits. Measurement is 
challenging in many environmental service markets, as Robertson (2007) describes in US 
wetland mitigation banking. While even national exchanges are complex, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) attempts to work at a vast spatial scale 
when certifying thousands of transnational trades. Establishing a system of this scale and scope 
is an enormous challenge. As evidence that the UNFCCC system continues to have weak spots, 
large verification agencies working under the CDM have lost official privileges after deficiencies 
were found in their verification and book-keeping practices. The UNFCCC is challenged to 
address criticisms that it is slow to certify emissions reductions while at the same time assuring 
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sufficient oversight so that self-interested actors are not able to cheat the system, and that highly 
diverse cases are each treated fairly. As it stands, the CDM lacks due process safeguards (von 
Unger and Streck, 2009). However, the UNFCCC structure is constantly evolving--the complex 
architecture of the institution means processes require substantial time. There are still many 
kinks to work out, so to speak. The UNFCCC attempts to regulate transparency in CDM 
emissions reductions, but it is plagued by questions of fairness, particularly in terms of 
governance on the part of the Executive Board (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Millar and Wilder, 
2009).  
Sustainable development was supposed to be an integral part of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Sustainability was not achieved in any of the seventeen CDM projects Sutter and Parreño (2007) 
assessed in terms of rates of local employment, air quality, and distribution of Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs). Concerns about sustainability in carbon mitigation programs 
were also expressed in Olsen (2007) and Anderson (2009), among others. Olsen (2007) 
concludes that left to market forces, the CDM does not significantly contribute to sustainable 
development. In part, issues arise because it remains unclear in the climate regime how to 
balance public goods with private rights (Werksman, 2008).  
Globally, there have been higher climate change costs among low income countries 
(Mendelsohn, Dinar, & Williams, 2006) and populations (Ribot, 2010). Nevertheless, a focus of 
negotiators from powerful countries has been to assure cheap carbon offsets for polluters in the 
industrialized world (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Peck, 2008). Within global environmental 
service markets, the search for inexpensive offsets reinforces inequity in the trading structure and 
who it benefits (Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009). It is often possible to identify trade-offs between 
carbon storage potential and resources for local subsistence (Chandani, 2007; Chhatrea and 
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Agrawal, 2010). In some cases, GHG mitigation projects have led to restricted resource local 
access to resources (Lohmann, 2006; Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009; Mate and Ghosh, 2009) or 
may disadvantage local knowledge (Lohmann, 2008). Another pattern is poor distribution of 
carbon market earnings to local communities. Some CDM projects in Latin America have been 
shown to disproportionately benefit national elites and foreigners (Lohmann, 2006; Lokey, 
2009).  These processes show that there can be ‗winners‘ and ‗losers‘ from the same situation at 
a national level concurrent to international inequities. For example, projects can become 
dependent on foreign expertise or equipment (Lokey, 2009). Policies and programs that are not 
created to fit a particular domestic situation may harm national capacity (Comim, 2008). Yet 
projects that create these negative impacts are often still implemented because they bring 
benefits to certain sectors of society. Working with a framework like double exposure helps to 
demonstrate that ‗winners‘ and ‗losers‘ are connected.   
The overall oversight of ecological and social sustainability of many CDM projects 
remains unsatisfactory (Lohmann, 2006; Olsen, 2007; Sutter and Parreño, 2007). There is a large 
and growing literature on social injustice in carbon markets (Baldwin, 2009; Gilbertson and 
Reyes, 2009; Mate and Ghosh, 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2010). In some instances 
carbon trade creates new ecological and social problems, and these trade-offs generally remain 
poorly analyzed (Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009; Peck, 2009). With more than 2,000 CDM projects 
verified, there is extensive offsetting experience to learn from. Meanwhile, an international 
climate justice movement is growing due to lack of attention to community development and 






Multi-scale Climate Policy Remains Incomplete 
While grassroots organizations clamor for non-market solutions to climate change in 
many countries of the world, most policy analysts expect carbon trade to continue as the 
dominant mitigation paradigm. There are a growing number of certification standards for carbon 
credits (e.g., the Gold Standard, the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standard, etc.). These 
provide targets, such as integral community development, participation, waste reduction, workers 
rights, etc., that emerged from the recognition of shortfalls in early GHG mitigation projects. 
Certification of standards adds to the expense of verifiable carbon offsets, but it creates oversight 
mechanisms for social and environmental factors that are frequently overlooked in conventional 
regulatory and voluntary trading schemes.  
Carbon trade, according to the Kyoto Protocol, was supposed to reduce the development 
gap between industrial nations and the rest of the world. Early experiences have fallen short of 
Kyoto‘s objectives. However, recommendations to improve governance and equity in the climate 
regime abound (e.g., Ackerman, 2008; Burkett, 2008; Brohé, Eyre, & Howarth, 2009; Millar and 
Wilder, 2009; von Unger and Streck, 2009; Okereke and Dooley, 2010; Quirion, 2010; White, 
Hatcher, Khare, Liddle, Molnar, & Sunderlin, 2010). After failure to reach agreement for post-
2012 climate policy in Copenhagen in December of 2009, tensions between countries and among 
groups of countries remain high (Doelle, 2010; Zelljadt, 2010). The unwillingness of US 
legislators to enact national climate policy receives international criticism as policymakers 
prepare for the next round of UNFCCC negotiations in December of 2010.  
The time for enabling climate justice is short, but the potential for creativity, reflexive 
justice and, socially inclusive orientations to climate change responses are wide open 
(Lotz-Sisitka, 2010, p. 87).  
 
Addressing climate change is the responsibility of more than just state institutions 
(Bulkeley and Newell, 2010; Rahm 2010). In particular, educators need to analyze and discuss 
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climate injustices, particularly given our urgent need to transition to a low carbon economy and 
to govern the climate in an inclusive manner (Lotz-Sisitka, 2010). Further, climate change 
governance needs to be a high priority on the global research agenda. Many knowledge gaps 
concerning GHG emission mitigation currently exist in natural and social sciences alike. 
However, tendencies among policy makers and researchers to offer simplistic, normative 
statements arguing climate change should be at the top of the agenda should be cautioned since 
sustainable development is integral and multi-faceted (Christoplos, 2010). Holistic, 
interdisciplinary analysis of proposed solutions is clearly necessary to understand trade-offs and 
achieve proactive, effective, and equitable climate policy. There is great potential for research 
highlighting connections between double winners and double losers, but associated risks are 
presented below.  
    
Conclusion 
        In this paper we set out to test the utility of double exposure as a concept for researching 
climate change and hazards in the Americas. Drawing on published research and four case 
studies of our own, we have demonstrated that looking for the intersections between 
globalization and global environmental change is in fact productive. In all of our cases, we found 
overlaps between these often related global change processes. But the outcomes of the 
interaction between the two processes were not consistent across cases. In the Bocas del Toro 
energy sector, we saw how efforts to mitigate the impacts of climate change in fact exacerbated 
the human rights abuses perpetuated under the logic of globalization. In Jamaica, we saw the 
same populations who were vulnerable to the increasing risk of infectious disease due to climate 
change were doubly at risk due to social marginalization reinforced by globalization. These 
different interactions—the ability to demonstrate double winners, double losers, and cases where 
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efforts to address one global change practice (perhaps unwittingly) expand inequity—are a 
powerful contribution to research on climate change and hazards because they sensitize us as 
researchers to system impacts that may otherwise go unnoticed. Moreover, the simultaneous 
attention to these two processes approximates the manner in which people actually manage risks 
in their communities. When making policy decisions about climate change and hazards, double 
exposure provides a more nuanced view that focusing on singular impacts or flows within 
mitigation and adaptation.  
Our cases demonstrate that, as a heuristic for case study analysis, double exposure can be 
used in multiple sectors, including health and energy. Our cases add to arguments of Leichenko 
and O‘Brien (2008) that double exposure can be applied to diverse situations. That said, we did 
find that applying double exposure as a method for analysis was less straightforward as we 
expanded the scale of our analysis. Particularly at the transnational scale it became difficult to 
determine the interacting impacts between globalization and climate change. At this scale, we 
doubt the utility of mapping the double exposure as was successfully done on the community 
level in O‘Brien and Leichinko (2004). 
The transnational case study of mitigation windfalls also highlighted an important tension 
between double winners and double losers. We started the fourth case study discussing how 
some companies and intermediaries are making and stand to make large profits from carbon 
trading. These entities are winners because of global environmental change, and they are also 
winners in the flow of global capital. Yet the same case study points to the simultaneous double 
losers: the communities, small companies, and individuals who lose autonomy over natural 
resources while others make profits. The framework of double exposures reveals different 
winners and losers in the same scenario. This is, of course, not surprising as far as winners often 
34 
 
mean that someone may be losing out. Our concern is that the existence of double winners in 
analysis and research may legitimize and justify action (in this case transnational carbon trading 
schemes) despite the double losers. We fear that policy analysis at various levels (local, regional, 
national, transnational) relies on cost-benefit analysis that does not sufficiently value ‗losers‘ nor 
prioritize equity when there is profit to be made. We worry that the ability to highlight the 
positives surrounding double winners—or even partial winners—may overshadow double losers, 
even though the concept is designed to highlight equity issues. Other academic traditions, such as 
political economy and political ecology, may be used to minimize this shortfall and demonstrate 
how the trajectories are connected with windfalls for a small few leading to deprivation for 
others. Nevertheless, we remain cautious of how double exposure analysis might be manipulated 
or twisted by policy makers.  
O‘Brien and Leichenko (2007/2008) outline issues of equity by directly highlighting 
differences in gender, nationality, class, etc. of double exposure processes. Nevertheless, Castree 
(2010) criticizes Leichenko and O‘Brien (2008) for ethical superficiality because they present 
double winners as if the category is ethically neutral. Nearly every development situation will 
likely involve trade-offs with moral consequences. Examples of trade-offs were presented in all 
four case studies above: issues of social equity are directly relevant in whether a Jamaican has 
adequate health care, an Argentinean farmer gets sufficient water, or Panamanian indigenous 
villages are relocated to produce hydroelectric energy. Moreover, the Jamaican case suggested 
that not prioritizing health care in light of rising sea-levels was itself a trade-off with associated 
ethical concerns. Our cases demonstrate important ethical implications that are not clearly 
brought into focus by the double exposure framework. 
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Castree (2010) uses his review of Leichenko and O‘Brien‘s (2008) book to encourage 
geographers and the academic community more broadly to directly address the ethically 
dimension of the topics we research. This argument is reminiscent of Liberation Ecologies (Peet 
and Watts, 1996/2006) and several other classic political ecology works. Political ecologists tend 
to keep issues of power, access, and distribution central to their analysis, whether related to 
issues of air and water pollution or natural resource management (Bryant, 1998; Peet and Watts, 
1996/2006). Many times, this involves spelling out the role of global development actors. For 
example, international finance institutions (IFIs) are highly involved in promoting carbon 
markets, while also standing to benefit from them. Access to carbon finance provides power to 
carbon investors and lenders. These implications need to be extensively researched and defined 
to promote transparency and public access to information. In contrast, processes of corporate 
lobbying to influence the global climate regime are poorly understood among the general public. 
Similarly, the responsibility of nation-states remains unclear, but states clearly remain strong 
actors in determining or blocking global responses, as well as in defining domestic adaptation 
and mitigation. The role of the state was important in each of the four case studies treated in this 
paper and thus we suggest it needs to be addressed directly and, when appropriate, critically. 
Even in the US, where the federal government has failed to play a leadership role, there have 
been decentralized responses at regional, state, and local governance scales (Bryne, Hughes, 
Rickerson, & Kurdgelashvili, 2007). Nonetheless, policy analysts are concerned with the 
seemingly upward shifts in governance and decision-making scales linked to climate policy. For 
example, the institutional architecture of GHG trade policy in the forest carbon sector in 
particular could create the potential for a recentralization of natural resource management after 
decades of movement towards decentralization and community engagement (Phelps, Webb, & 
36 
 
Agrawal, 2010). Governance shifts linked to climate policy need to be analyzed in greater detail 
within extensive cross-national and multi-scale research sensitive to issues of social justice and 
community development.  
We recommend complementary bodies of literature to complement double exposure 
analysis. The centrality of scale and power issues, of which the ones mentioned above are only a 
small selection, suggests drawing from additional political ecology literature could be beneficial 
(e.g., Peet and Watts, 1996; Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter & Wangari, 1996; Swyngedouw, 1997, 
2004; Blaikie, 1999; Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown & Svarstad, 2001; Zimmerer and Bassett, 
2003; Robbins, 2004; etc.). Political ecology provides an instrumental framework for the study 
of multi-scale, nature-society interactions that change over time (Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). 
Political ecologists have successfully analyzed multiple scales without losing sight of the local 
(e.g., Swyngedouw, 1997, 2004). This detailed attention to scale and scope is necessary to avoid 
mistakes during climate change adaptation and mitigation. Cutting-edge analysis of climate 
change policy is imperative to improve current practices. The work of environmental geopolitical 
theorists, such as Sletto (2003) and Dalby (2003, 2004), could also support both domestic and 
foreign policy analysis of complex interactions in the realm of environmental policy. 
        In an effort to help refine the conceptualization and methodological application of 
double exposure, we offer the following limitations of double exposure as a research method. 
These limitations are suggested in the spirit of friendly criticism in the hopes we can contribute 








Researchers have identified a number of potential limitations to the double exposure 
research method (e.g., O‘Brien et al., 2004; Castree, 2010; Christoplos, 2010). We draw from 
and build upon these critiques as a means to encourage ongoing engagement with double 
exposure.  
Method. As noted in the literature review, Leichinko and O‘Brien (2008) present double 
exposures as a conceptual framework for study, but do not detail a precise method for applying 
this framework in academic analysis. In a book review, Bailey (2009) notes: ―The double 
exposure framework may strike some readers as very broad and lacking some analytical 
precision, but I would argue that this is necessary to capture the essence and plasticity of 
interactions between these two sets of forces‖ (p. 243). Although we are sympathetic to the 
argument that the double exposures framework is necessarily broad, the lack of analytical 
precision remains a drawback, particularly for scholars other than Leichinko and O‘Brien using 
and contributing to the approach.  
As one additional limitation, several central concepts (e.g., resilience, vulnerability) and 
discourses used by natural scientists to understand global environmental change are not 
universally accepted in the social sciences. Although it is clearly necessary to bridge the natural 
and social sciences and to work across disciplines, it is hard to integrate diverse discourses as 
they build from highly different epistemic frameworks. Klein (2009) notes related disjuncture 
between definitions of concepts like vulnerability among academics and development 
practitioners, as well as legal ambiguity in the usage of such concepts by policy makers. 
        Scale. As we note above, at the level of transnational scale application the researcher 
loses the fine-grained, place-based examples that more clearly show cause-effect relationships 
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between global environmental change and globalization (Hidayat & Stuhl, 2010). This poses 
both theoretical and methodological challenges. In terms of theory-building, regional scale 
analysis is more likely to use ―double exposures‖ as a general concern with the overlapping 
impacts of globalization and climate change. Although this approach make prove useful for 
exploring individual case studies, it could end up undermining efforts to formalize double 
exposures as a theory about the causal relationship between the global change processes since 
researchers would be making a more general use of the concept as a heuristic device. In terms of 
method, mapping double exposures at intermediary and macro scales seems daunting due to 
availability of appropriate data. Activities and ―flows‖ are changing too rapidly to be 
satisfactorily categorized and mapped (Malone, 2002). This is particularly true at macro scales, 
such as our fourth case study. 
        Mapping. Even moving away from the particular challenges of mapping at a macro-
level, mapping double exposures poses important challenges that have yet to be fully resolved. 
As O‘Brien et al. (2004) point out, maps can imply abrupt boundaries where fuzzy boundaries 
are more appropriate. This is particularly true for dynamic processes like vulnerability. 
Determining special representations of key indicators that determine local vulnerability (e.g. 
social capital, institutional relationships, etc.) remains a challenge (Eakin and Luers, 2006). Our 
case studies do not tackle the challenge of mapping in practice. Nonetheless, even in the case of 
Jamaica where economic, health, and environmental data exists at a manageable scale, actually 
mapping the vulnerability isn‘t straightforward or obvious. Mapping the interaction between the 
dynamic processes of global environmental change and globalization seems daunting even at the 
local level—despite O‘Brien et al. (2004) demonstrating that it can be done. One concern with 
regional, meso-, or macro- scale applications, is that specific impacts from positive or negative 
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feedback loops can be identified more easily in particular communities or ecosystems. We note 
particular challenges for researchers who wish to map vulnerabilities linked to double exposures. 
Boundaries would likely be dynamic, porous, and heterogeneous over time and space. The nature 
of risk also changes over time (Silva, Eriksen, & Ombe, 2010). 
      Dynamics unknown. This discussion of the interactions between globalization and global 
environmental change points to a conceptual limitation inherent in the call to consider both 
processes simultaneously: is it possible to tease out the dynamics of interacting effects? In some 
of our cases, such as the proposed dam project in Bocas del Toro, it appears obvious that an 
attempt to mitigate the impacts of climate change will in fact hurt indigenous groups, although 
there are benefits for Panamanian society at large. The interaction between globalization and 
climate change is evident since the interaction centers around the proposed dam project justified 
by climate change and to feed increasing energy demand from Panama‘s rapidly expanding 
economy. Similarly, the economic impacts of globalization in the Mendoza region of Argentina 
occurred temporally before the some of the changes in water availability. Yet in Jamaica, the 
interactions between globalization and climate change are less clear because this is an on-going, 
seasonal problem that is getting worse due to global environmental changes. This case shows 
that it is productive to discuss how the two global change processes increase the vulnerability of 
particular groups; the dual attention to globalization and global environmental change is a 
powerful combination. Yet determining the nature of interaction effects is less straightforward. 
As Eakin and Luers (2006) observe, ―O‘Brien et al.‘s model of double exposure as applied to 
India (72)… is attractive in that it captures visually the idea of overlapping stressors on a 
population, yet the nature of the interaction, the relative importance of distinct stressors for 
particular systems at any given time, and the possible nonlinear responses of a system to multiple 
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stressors remain elusive‖ (p. 379-380).  The precise dynamics of double exposure interactions 
are particularly important should double exposures be developed as causal argument, but the 
framework is not best designed to discuss how these exposures are related. ―The framework 
implies a linear sequence and may obscure the relationships and feedbacks among processes, 
contexts, exposure units, responses, and outcomes: while the framework may be constructed for 
the reader to comprehend the concept of double exposures, it undermines the discussion of the 
relatedness of double exposures‖ (Hidayat and Stuh, 2010, p. 87). 
        Oversimplification. Given the limitations above that point to the challenges in capturing 
the dynamics of double exposures, it may seem unfair to also call double exposures prone to 
oversimplification. Yet ―the concept of double exposure may hide the complexity of the range of 
factors that hide under the multiple levels and institutions within the processes of global 
environmental change and globalization‖ (Christoplos, 2010, n.p.). Double exposure as defined 
and utilized currently does not sufficiently portray or clarify the interplay between governance 
scales and among political agents. While we expect individual researchers will uncover and 
communicate these important factors, we would encourage greater clarification at the onset given 
their central importance in several of the case studies and in much of the literature reviewed in 
this work.  
Double exposure as currently envisioned as a research framework is so broad it could 
encompass most current development processes in Latin America. The overarching, conceptually 
inclusive of the double exposure framework could signify that important factors receive less 
attention than they deserve. For example, according to Castree (2010), the topic of equity, 
although identified as of central importance, comes across as being glossed over in Leichinko 
and O‘Brien (2008).  
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        Multiple exposures rather than double exposures. Even the broad categories of 
globalization and global environmental change do not necessarily capture all of the risks to 
which a community is vulnerable nor all of the factors that might be included in risk analysis. 
For example, natural hazards like earthquakes (Christoplos, 2010) are not related to global 
environmental change, yet they pose important risks to certain communities. If the goal of 
research is to fully assess vulnerability, adaptability, or mitigation efforts, double exposures may 
be too limited of a lens.  
There is clearly complexity in the types and degrees of exposure. For example, case study 
three suggested the need to pay specific attention to human rights and to respect international 
norms for the protection of Indigenous Peoples‘ rights, including land tenure. Although while we 
mention that the double exposure framework has not shed light on how to weigh development 
trade-offs against each other, existing analytical frameworks have not been able to do that either. 
While double exposure has a number of strengths, there is clearly a need to continue to combine 
this research literature with other traditions, including political economy and political ecology. 
Case study four in particular suggested likely benefit from drawing on political ecology due to 
the tradition of using this framework to highlight scalar and power issues in dynamic, complex 
nature-society interactions.  
Anthropogenic climate change and carbon markets create emerging human-environment 
interactions that bridge industrial and developing countries in intense and complicated ways. 
There are vast opportunities for timely research on climate change adaptation and mitigation. 
Natural and social scientists have important roles to play in finding sustainable pathways that 
contribute to the reduction of social and ecological risks associated with climate change and 
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